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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The defendant-appellant was charged in the Fourth
Judicial District Court in and for Juab County, State of Utah,
by way of an amended information with two counts of Forcible
Sexual Abuse in violation of Section 76-5-404, U.C.A.

(1953},

as amended.
'lhe first count of the amended information charged that
the defendant did on or about the 4th day of August, 1979, at
Nephi, Juab County, Utah, cause another to take indecent
liberties with Toni Kennedy without her consent, with the intent
to arouse or gratify the defendant's sexual desires.
'lhe second count of the amended information charged that
the defendant did on or about the 22nd day of August, 1979, at
Nephi, Juab County, Utah, to take indecent liberties with Toni
Kennedy without her consent, with the intent to arouse or gratify
the defendant's sexual desires.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The defendant-appellant was found guilty of two counts
of Forcible Sexual Abuse before the lower Court setting without
a jury, in violation of Section 76-5-404, U.C.A.

(1953), as

amended, on the 27th day of November, 1979.
After the matter was referred to the Adult Probation
and Parole Department for a presentence investigation, the defendant was sentenced on Count I and Count II to be confined in the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services

Utah state Prison
for
an indeterminate
term
not to exceed five
Library Services
and Technology
Act, administered by the Utah
State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(5) years on both counts with each sentence to run concurrently
with one another.
The lower Court denied the defendant's oral motion for a
certificate of probable cause pursuant to Section 77-39-9,
U.C.A.

(1953), as amended.
The lower Court previously denied the defendant's motion

to Quash or in the alternative to dismiss the amended information
on the 16th day of October, 1979, on the basis that Section 76-5404, U.C.A.

(1953), as amended, was not so indefinite and vague

as to violate the requirements of the Due Process of Law Requirements of the Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 7 and of
the United States Constitution's Amendments V and XIV.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks reversal of the Fourth Judicial
District Court Judgment, in and for Juab County, State of Utah,
in that Section 76-5-404, U.C.A.

(1953), as amended, is unconsti-

tutional insofar as it deals with indecent liberties in that such
section is so indefinite and vague in defining the prohibited
acts that it denies the appellant due process of law as defined
by the Utah State Constitution and the Constitution of the United
States.
The appellant additionally seeks reversal of the lower
Court's judgment in that the weight and sufficiency of the evidence
produced at trial by the State of Utah against the appellant is so
lacking and unsubstantial that reasonable men could not possibly
reach guilty verdicts beyond a reasonable doubt in that the State
by the S.J.
Law Library.
Funding for digitization
provided by the Institute
of Museum
and Library
of UtahSponsored
failed
toQuinney
prove
beyond
a reasonable
doubt
that
(1)Services
the
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appellant caused another to take indecent liberties with Toni
Kennedy, his wife,
76-5-406, U.C.A.

(2} without her consent as defined in Section

(1953}, as amended, and (3) such acts, if any,

were for the purpose and with the requisite intent to arouse or
gratify the appellant's sexual desires.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
At the preliminary hearing the State of Utah introduced
over the appellant's objection an affidavit signed by one B.E.
Marshall and indicated to the Court at such preliminary hearing
that the State would produce Mr. Marshall at the trial of the
appellant.
Mr. Marshall was never called at the appellant's trial
but his affidavit did indicate that Mr. Marshall did not know
Mrs. Kennedy did not consent to his or Mr. Kennedy's actions,
but merely going on to note that he observed numerous arguments
between Mr. and Mrs. Kennedy during the four day period he was
there without further explanation as to what the arguments were
over.
It should also be pointed out that no charges of rape
were, to the very

best of counsel's knowledge, ever filed against

Mr. Marshall or the other individual she was alleged to be forced
into having sex with, another man referred to as Rick.

Additonal·

ly, to the best of counsel's knowledge, no criminal action is
pending or anticipated against either individual.
The complainant, Mrs. Toni Kennedy, was married to the
appellant at the time of the trial.
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Mrs. Kennedy testified against the appellant at the time

of trial and it is primarily her word which the Court chose to
believe over the appellant's in which the Court found the appellant
guilty.
As will be discussed more thoroughly later, any sexual act
she engaged in appeared to be for monitary remuneration rather
than the sexual gratification of the defendant and it is difficult
to see from reading the entire transcript of the trial how any
sexual act she engaged in can be said to be against her consent
as defined by the statute.
Ps noted earlier, the appellant was charged and convicted

of Forcible Sexual Abuse by allegedly forcing his wife, Toni
Kennedy, to have sex with other men without her consent for the
purpose and with the intent of arousing or gratifying the
appellant's sexual desires.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THE CHARGES AGAINST THE DEFENDANT SHOULD BE DISMISSED ON
THE GROUNDS THAT THE LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE UNDER WHICH
HE IS CHARGED ARE SO INDEFINITE AND VAGUE AS TO VIOLATE
THE REQUIREMENTS OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH, ARTICLE I, SECTION
7, AND OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, AMENDMENT V AND AMENDMENT XIV.

Section 76-5-404, U.C.A. 1953 (Supp. 1979}, provides:
(11 A person commits forcible sexual abuse if, under
circumstances not amounting to rape or sodomy, or
attempted rape or sodomy, the actor touches the anus
or any part of the genitals of another, or otherwise
takes indecent liberties with another, or causes
another to take indecent liberties with the actor or
another, with the intent to cause substantial emotional
or bodily pain to any person or with intent to arouse
or gratify the sexual desire of any person, without the
consent of the other, regardless of the sex of any
participant.

(2)
Forcible sexual abuse is a felony of the third
degree.
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charged under that language of the statute

which proscribes the taking of indecent liberties with another
with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desires of any
person.

By his appeal, the defendant raises first the question

whether his supposed conduct is included in the definition of
"taking of indecent liberties with another."

Could the legis-

lature have intended that such an act would fall under the same
penalty as the other enumerated acts in the statute, e.g. the
touching of the anus or genitals of another?

Even more crucial,

however, is the question whether the language of the statute is
sufficiently explicit in its prohibition that the defendant could
have known, before the commission of such an act, that it would
subject him to prosecution for this third degree felony?
The test for whether a statute is so indefinite as to
violate due process requirements has been adequately stated by a
number of United States Supreme Court decisions.

In United States

v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 72 S.Ct. 808, 98 L. Ed. 989 (1954), the
Court considered whether the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act
2 and S.C. Sections 305, 307, and 308, was too vague and indefinit
As a test for vagueness, the Court stated:
The constitutional requirement of definiteness is
violated by a criminal statute that fails to give
a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that
his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute.
The underlying principle is that no man shall be held
criminally responsible for conduct which he could not
reasonably understand to be proscribed.
347 U.S. at
617, 74 s.ct. at 812.
In Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct.
2294, 33 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1972), the Court elaborated upon the
rationale behind the definiteness requirement, and stated:
Vague laws offend several important values.
First,
because we assume that man is free to steer between
lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he
may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. Second, if
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be
prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for
those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly
delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges,
and juries, for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective
basis, with the attendant danger of arbitrary and
discriminatory application.
408 U.S. at 108-109.
The same rationale is repeated in Smith v. Goguen, 415
U.S. 566, 94 s.ct. 1242, 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974), which considered whether a Massachusetts flag-abuse statute was unconstitutionally vague.
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted the same test for
vagueness.

In State v. Packard, 250 P.2d 561 (1952), the Court

stated a three-pronged test, of which one of the factors may be
viewed as a mere rewording of one another.

The Court wrote:

Concerning the question of uncertainty or vagueness
of statutes, the authorities seem to be in accord
that the test a statute must meet to be valid is:
It must be sufficiently definite (a) to inform
persons of ordinary intelligence, who would be law
abiding, what their conduct must be to conform to
its requirements, (b) to advise a defendant accused
of violating it just what constitutes the offense
with which he is charged, and (c) to be susceptible
of uniform interpretation and application by those
charged with responsibility of applying and enforcing it.
250 P.2d at 564.
For the purposes of this appeal, the second factor of the
Court's test is clearly includable in the first.

Otherwise, the

law clearly requires that a statute be sufficiently explicit
that both the general public and the law enforcement establishment would be able to know, without doubt or disagreement,
precisely what conduct is prohibited.
A further aspect of the vagueness test results from the
following consideration:

to say that due process requires that

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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person that his contemplated conduct is prohibited, or that it
requires that a statute inform a person who would be law abiding
what his conduct must be to conform to the law, implies the
further rule that a statute will not be judged purely on its
face nor on the basis of hypotheticals, but will be analyzed
according to whether, under the facts and circumstances of the
particular case, the defendant himself was given sufficient
warning that his specific conduct was prohibited by the law.
This rule, announced by the United States Supreme Court in
United States v. National Dairy Producers' Corporation, 372
U.S. 29, 83 S.Cte 594, 9 L.Ed.2d 561 (1963), as well as in other
cases, means, for the purposes of this case, that the issue is
whether U.C.A. 76-5-404 is sufficiently explicit that the defendant should have known that his alleged conduct would be includable in this third degreee felony.

The appellant submits

that the statute is not sufficiently explicit, but rather that
it is so ambiguous and indefinite that he could not have known
prior to his alleged conduct that he could be charged under this
section and that must be the fact notwithstanding the fact that
he may have been charged under some other section of the criminal
code nor the fact that the Court is offended by the occurrence.
Jh order for the statute in question to meet the require-

ments of due process in this case, the language "indecent
liberties" as used in the statute must not only be susceptible
of some precise definition, but that definition must be so
apparent or well established that

~ersons

of ordinary intelligence

in this jurisdiction could reasonably ascertain what the definitiOO
is.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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definitions of statutory terms must

o::=.=-------·-==~~

one of three sources: common usage among those subject to the
law; explanations by the judiciary, the legislature, or other
authorities; and prior applications of the law to specific
factual situations.
698 (1st Cir. 1978).

(See Balthazar v. Superior Court, 573 F.2d.
Given any of these three factors, the

language of a statute may be validly construed either to include
or to exclude a particular act, and all interested parties will
be held to a knowledge of that construction.

But absent a

common understanding of the meaning of terms, absent a relevant
explanation by the legislature or the judiciary, and absent prior
judicial decisions applying the language to similar conduct, a
defendant cannot reasonably be expected to foresee the unlawfulness of his act.

He would therefore have grounds to raise the

objection of vagueness.
Such is precisely the situation in this case.

The term

"indecent liberties" as used in the statute clearly cannot be
said to include the acts which the Appellant is alleged to have
done.
Even if such an act were generally considered to be an
"indecent liberty" in generic terms, it would not necessarily
follow that the legislature meant by use of the same generic
language to include it in the statute's prohibitions.

An in-

finite variety of acts could be agreed generally to be "indecent
liberties" but obviously not all such acts were intended by the
legislature to invoke third degree felony penalties.

Given that

some "indecent liberties" must be excluded from coverage by the
statute, the crucial question becomes whether it is corrunonly
understood that the alleged actions of the Appellant is one of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of Utah should have charged the appellant with rape as a
principal under the aiding and abetting section of the criminal
code if in fact it believed the appellant to have in fact done
such acts.

Because the statute refers specifically to only two

other acts, the touching of the anus or genitals of another, it
certainly cannot be reasonably concluded that everyone would
understand that the alleged acts of the appellant is prohibited
by the "other indecent liberties" language of this statute.
Further, there have been neither judicial explanations,
legislative reports, nor cases of record which have construed
the Utah statute in question to include the acts which the
appellant is charged with.

Prior police practices are not

sufficient, if they exist in this case, because the due process
requirement would demand that authoritative construction of the
language appear as of record before a defendant would be held
liable for the knowledge that his act was prohibited under the
statute.

See Driscoll v. Schmidt, 354 F. Supp. 1225 (W.D.Wisc.

197 3) •

lbsent a general consensus as to what U.C.A. 76-5-404
means by "indecent liberties," and absent any other authoritative
definition of the terms, the appellant could not reasonably have
known that such an act would be included in the statute, and his
prosecution under the statute is void because of the violation
of his rights to due process.

Several cases of recent vintage

present similar conclusions in the context of similar facts.
In Balthazar v. Superior Court, supra, the First Circuit
court of Appeals reviewed the habeas corpus petition of a defendant convicted under the Massachusetts law prohibiting "unnatural
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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.strict

Court affirmed.

The Court discussed the three sources of

statutory definitions, outlined above, and noted that in the
present case none of the three sources supplied a sufficiently
precise explanation of the terms as used in the statute.

Al-

though both "unnatural acts" and "lascivious acts" were
separately well defined terms in ordinary usage, when combined
in the statute as if jointly to describe single acts, they created
an ambiguity as to whether the defendant's conduct, fellatio and
oral-anal contact, were included.

The Court concluded:

The general rule is that constitutional challenges
of vagueness must be based on a statute's
application to the particular case . . . We so limit
our decisions today to the question of whether [the
statute] as applied to petitioner, gave him fair
notice as required by due process standards that
his conduct, i.e. fellatio and oral-anal contact,
constituted an "unnatural and lascivious act"
proscribed by criminal statute. * * * In light of
the diversity of conduct that could conceivably
be covered by the terms "unnatural" and "lascivious"
and the fact that there are certainly acts that are
less natural and more universally condemned than
Balthazar's conduct, . . . Balthazar could reasonably believe that the statute was aimed at other
acts than his.
573 F. 2d at 700, 701.
Thus, Balthazar illustrates that though the terms used
by the statute, on their face and out of context, may have a
generally accepted meaning in the community, when they are incorporated by the legislature into the statute together with
other terms, their meanings may be changed, limited, and
obscured in such a way that it becomes unreasonable to expect
the ordinary person to understand precisely what is meant.

As

will be pointed out later, the defendant would certainly have
had a chance at a trial guaranting that he would be afforded
due process considerations if he had been charged under another
sectionSponsored
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heLibrary.
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committed.
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Similarly, in the present case, although "indecent
liberties" may have a generally accepted meaning in the community
when used alone, when incorporated into the statute and made to
relate to the other terms of that statute, the same term loses
its generally accepted meaning, and the defendant cannot be held
liable unless some other source of authority was sufficient to
inform him that his alleged actions were included in the meaning
of the statute.
In Driscoll v. Schmidt, 354 F Supp. 1225 (W.D. Wisc.
1973}, a defendant was charged with taking indecent liberties

with the privates of a person under the age of 18.

In a vague-

ness attack, the Court considered the question whether the defendant, when he engaged in fellatio and cunnilingus with his stepdaughter, could have reasonably understood that his conduct was
prohibited by the statute.

The Court held the language of the

statute vague, on its face, but found that in Wisconsin Jury
Instructions #1527 and #1528 there were sufficient explanations
of the terms to constitute fair warning to the defendant that
his conduct was unlawful.
In Miami Health Studios v. City of Miami Beach, 353 F.
Supp. 593 (S.D.Fla. 1973), another Federal District Court dealt
with the language of F. S .A. S 796. 07 (1) (b)

(1971), which pro-

hibited lewd acts in certain places and stated:
The term lewdness shall be construed to include
any indecent or obscene act.
In finding the statute unconstitutionally vague, the Court
stated:
In the Court's opinion,. [the statuteJ is so vague,
indefinite, and uncertain as to render it violative
of
the
petitioner's
and
Fourteenth
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particularly subsection (1) (b) thereof, is not so
clearly and definitely expressed that a man or
woman of common intelligence could determine in
advance whether his or her contemplated act was
within or without the law . . . . The Courts of
Florida have provided no enlightenment with
respect to construction of the statute in question,
nor has there been authoritative interpretation of
the particularly offending phrase, "'lewdness' shall
be construed to include any indecent or obscene
act," found in subsection (1) (b} of the statute.
353 F. Supp. at 597-598.
The case thus further illustrates that due process requires
some authoritative pronouncement or interpretation of otherwise
ambiguous terms.
Jh District of Columbia v. Walters, 319 A.2d 332 (Ct.App.

D.C. 1974), a District statute declared it unlawful to commit a
"lewd, obscene, or indecent act."

The defendant and eight others

were arrested in a commercial establishment for engaging in acts
of mutual masturbation.

In discussing the interpretation of the

statute, the Court referred to the testimony of the Director of
Morals Division of the Metropolitan Police to the effect that he
had neither received nor promulgated any guidelines as to the
types of conduct included in the above statute.

Other officers

testified that the statute was generally applied against homosexuals and that new officers were trained by reference to arrest
and prosecution records, but that there was no other interpretation of the conduct

inclu~ed

in the terms.

The trial court held

that the statute was unconstitutionally vague, and the Appellate
Court affirmed, stating:
The statute betrays the classic defects of vagueness in that it fails to give clear notice of
what conduct is forbidden and invests the police
with excessive discretion to decide, after the fact,
who has violated the law . . . . fT]here is a broad,
gray area in which the words of the statute will
substantially
different
standards
toLibrary Services
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or indecent act" the statute is so encyclo-

pedic in its reach that the areas of reasonable
disagreement are limitless.
319 A.2d at 335.
Thus, Walters illustrates that although the conduct of
the defendant would be considered lewd, obscene, or indecent
under almost anyone's standards, where the constitutionality of
a statute is in question, the real issue is whether the legislature's use of those terms was meant to include the defendant's
conduct, and whether, if so, the defendant reasonably could have
known that the legislature so intended.

In the present case, it

may be clear that the community generally would agree that the
allegations against the appellant if proved and if without the
consent of the alleged victim would amount to an "indecent
liberty."

But the real question is whether the legislature's

use of that generic term was meant to include such an act, and
more importantly, whether the appellant could reasonably have
known that the legislature intended to prohibit the conduct for
which he is charged.

It would seem that, for reasons stated

above, the appellant could not reasonably have forseen that the
statute under which he is charged and convicted would include his
alleged conduct.
A similar analysis was discussed in State v. Sharpe, 205
N.E.2d 113 (Ct.App. Ohio 1965).

There, a defendant was charged

with soliciting an "unnatural sexual-act" under Ohio Rev. Code
S 2905.30.

The Court discussed the infinite biological and

sociological range of sexual acts, enumerating many which are
unnatural but clearly not immoral (e.g. birth control techniques,
artificial insemination, etc.), but finding no cases or authorities to limit the term used in the statute.

The

~ourt conclud~:

In spite of the possibility that a trial jury may
apply reason and discretion
is and is not an unnatural
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evidence of a specific case, the objection still
exists that persons, innocent or otherwise, are
obviously subject to arrest and prosecution
under this statute without having any positive
guide whereby the solicited or the solicitor
may know whether the act proposed is unnatural.
Even the policeman does not have a sufficient
standard to determine whether what he may have
seen or heard requires an arrest.
205 N.E. 2d
at 114-115.
The statute was therefore held unconstitutional.
In the present case, perhaps the greatest injustice is
that the defendant could not have known, prior to his arrest,
that his alleged actions would subject him to the penalties of
this third degree felony charge under this section.

The

language of the statute leaves to the police the discretion to
choose, by their own standards or preferences, what acts will
be prosecuted and which will not.
The Utah Supreme Court when faced with a criminal section
proscribing two or more persons to conspire "to commit any act
injurious . . . to public morals.

.

11

stated that the offense

needs:
"to give adequate guidance to those who would be
law-abiding, to advise defendants to the nature of the offense
with which they are charged, or to guide courts in trying those
who are accused. 11 State v. Musser (Utah 1950), 223 P. 2d 193.
The Court concluded the statute was unconstitutionally
vague.
The issue presented is what does the phrase "indecent
liberties" mean?
other

By the statute itself, it means some act

than touching the anus or genitals of another, since the

phrase "indecent liberties" is separated from the portion of
the statute specifying that conduct by the disjunctive
"otherwise."
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An attemot was made by the Utah Court to define "in-

decent liberties" in State v. MacMillan, 46

u.

19, 145 P. 833

(1915) , at 834.
Its efforts failed in a cloud of propriety, calling
"indecent" "self defining," and labelling as "indecent" specifically disclosing the defendant's particularity.
It should be noted as well, that the issue raised in
MacMillan, supra was the sufficiency of the information and not
the adequacy of the statute under constitutional provisions.
What other act then is an "indecent liberty" under the
Statute?

A non-consented kiss, embrace or a touching of the

abdomen or some other non-genital area of the body?

Is a

touching even required?
The Merriam-Webster Dictionary, Copyright 1974, defines

I.
1

"indecent" as "Not decent; unbecoming, unseemly; also morally
offensive."
Indecent is an adjective which varies and differs with
each individual's judgment.

The definition attached by indi-

viduals varies with each individuals morals.

No strict defin-

ition may be attached since morals of each individual or cornrnunity varies.

It may be offensive to one person to embrace

another and to another it would not.
The statutory interpretations given by the Utah Courts
and others are of no help.

State v. MacMillan supra finds the

term "self-defining."
An analagous case to the present determination is State
of Kansas v. Conley, 216 Kan. 66, 531 P.2d 36 (1975).
There the information charged the defendant in the general
language of K.S.A. 21-3503 (1)

(b) with committing the offense of
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indecent liberties with a child.

The C:c::,=-t

I

•

of whether the language used is so vague that it fails to warn
as to conduct sought to be proscribed.

The State argued that

the term "indecent liberties" conveys such warning to persons
of common intelligence.
The statute in Conley, supra stated:
"Indecent liberties with a child.
(1)
(b) Any
lewd fondling or touching of the person of .
the
child .
done . . . with the intent to arouse or
satisfy the sexual desires of . . . the offender."
The Court noted that "the particular name or label of
an offense cannot be used to bootstrap a statutory definition
otherwise lacking in specificity.

It seems doubtful the legis-

lature meant to proscribe every form of touching of the person
even though some degree of sexuality be present as in youthful
kissing or embracing, yet that can be argued from the language
used.

Where ascertainable standards of guilt declaring just

what conduct is forbidden."

531 P.2d at 39.

The Kansas Court next met this question in State v. Wells,
573 P.2d 580 (1977), after the statute had been amended to state,
in pertinent part, "Any lewd fondling or touching

II

The

Court accepted that as curing the defect noted in the Conley
opinion supra.
The defendant herein argues that the Utah Statute does
not reach beyond the language found inadequate in Conley.

There

the Court found that the title "indecent liberties" combined with
the defining phrase "fondling or touching" was not sufficient to
declare what conduct was forbidden and therefore did not satisfy
constitutional requirements of due process.

How then could the

Utah Statute in question satisfy the Conley test?
The combination of "forcible sexual abuse" and "indecent
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liberties" is even less descriptive than the statute found
deficient in Conley and therefore could no more satisfy the
constitutional requirements of due process.
An individual is not given fair warning of the statute's
proscription as required by the due process clause when the term
may vary from one individual to another, or one community to
another community, and where such a statute does not serve to
warn of proscribed conduct.
POINT II.

THE EVIDENCE IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT,

'lhe appellant asserts that the evidence is entirely so

! '

lacking and unsubstantial that reasonable men could not possibly
reach a guilty verdict beyond a reasonable doubt in that the
State of Utah failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1)
the appellant caused others to take indecent liberties with Toni
Kennedy, his wife,
76-5-406, U.C.A.

(2} without her consent as defined in Section

(1953}, as amended, and (3)

such acts, if any,

were for the purpose and with the specific intent to arouse or
gratify the sexual desires of the appellant.
From a reading of the trial transcript, the appellant
cannot find any evidence in the least which shows that the
appellant caused another to take indecent liberties with Toni
Kennedy.
According to the appellant's testimony on cross examination and as supported by the rest of the transcript, the

appell~

merely allowed Toni Kennedy's sexual appetite to occur in order to
keep peace.

See page 65 of the trial transcript.

The most that appears is that the appellant allowed the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
sexual
activity
to occur, but there is no evidence that he caused
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I.

others to engage in acts with Toni Kennedy.

The most that can

be said is that the appellant did not stop others from engaging
in sexual acts with Toni Kennedy.
In particular, it should be noted at page 14 of the
transcript that the appellant did not even like the individual
known as Rick according to the complainant and it is hard to
understand how or why the appellant would cause Rick to have
sexual relations with Toni Kennedy, the appellant's wife, unless Toni Kennedy in fact wished to engage in such conduct,
particularly since Rick had tried to get Toni Kennedy to divorce
the appellant in March of 1979.

See page 28 of the trial

transcript line 6 through 10.
'lhis brings us to the more essential element which is
missing from the States case.
Section 76-5-406(1) and (2}, U.C.A.

(1953), as amended,

defines when an act is without the consent of the alleged victim.
Section 76-5-406(1) indicates there is no consent:
When the actor compels the victim to submit or
participate by force that overcomes such earnest
resistance as might reasonably be expected under
the circumstances.
Section 76-5-406(2)

indicates there is no consent when:

The actor compels the victim to submit or participate
by any threat that would prevent resistance by a
person of ordinary resolution.
The remaining portions of Sections 76-5-406 are clearly
not applicable to this case.
The most recent pronouncement of the Utah Supreme Court
is the case of State v. Myers, No. 16223, filed January 24, 1980.
In that case the defendant pinned the complainants hands
to the Sponsored
seat by
and
after the occurrence she was crying, her skirt
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was ripped, her blouse was torn, a strip of her hair was missing,
and she had red marks on her arm.

Additionally, she was taken

to the hospital to confirm recent intercourse and patches of
bruises and scratching were observed on her body.
In the case of State v. Reddish, 550 P.2d 728

(1976)

the Utah Supreme Court noted that the victim screamed, resisted,
tried to get away, but the defendant seized and held her, choked
her and threatened her life which overcame her resistance.

The

Court noted she immediately called the police and a physical
examination was done on the victim which noted that she had
fresh scratches on her face and bruises on her neck.

Additional-

ly, the officers had found that the ground was torn up where the
struggle was alleged to have taken place.
The Court noted at page 729 after referring to the
statute:
From that statute it is seen that the overcoming
of the victim's will can be accomplished either
by force or threats; and it may also be accomplished by a combination of them, which the
States evidence tends to show here . • . . to
meet the requirements of making clear to the jury
that the force and threats had to be of such
character and such an effect on the prosecutrix
as to overcome an earnest desire on her part to
resist.
In the case of State v. Nuney, 520

~.2d

881 (1974),

the Utah Supreme Court noted that the prosecutrix had pleaded
with the defendant to take her home and that the defendant
ordered her into the back seat and threatened her with violence
if she did not comply.

The prosecutrix testified she greatly

feared physical abuse in that an inquiry was made by one of the
men as to the location of a knife which was in the car.
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The defendant in Nuney indicated the knife was used to

~

pick the lock on the car of the automobile, but the Court noted
the

prosecut~ix

was unaware that the knife would be used for

that purpose.
Additionally in Nuney, the Court stated that a police
car approached the automobile and a companion of the defendant
fled and hid in the bushes and the prosecutrix cried out she
had been raped.
The Court referred to Section 76-5-406(2) of the present
criminal code and affirmed the conviction in the case of Nuney.
Cbmpare the three foregoing cases with that of the
appellants.
At page 8 of the transcript the prosecutrix stated that
she had sexual intercourse with a man she called B.J., and she
stated at line 30 with reference to what she did with B.J. that:
I just wanted to hurry and get it over with,
but he wanted to try all kinds of different
positions, and I said I didn't want to . . . .
At page 9 of the transcript after the appellant had
helped B.J. make his bed on the couch, the prosecutrix indicated
at line 25, the prosecutrix said B.J. had said she had let him
finish, "so I had intercourse with B.J., and then Charles had
intercourse, well, just fast to get it over with, and then they
went out of the bedroom and out in the front room, and I went
to sleep."
The prosecutrix indicated at page 12 of the transcript
she had intercourse with B.J. two or three more nights.

But

she never called the police nor were any threats mentioned
against her.

At page 12, line 17 the prosecutrix merely in-

dicated that the appellant said she had to keep doing it until
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wasn't bad enough that I had to go to bed with him but he was
very obnoxious."
At page 13, line 11, the prosecutrix answered that
"My main restraint was begging Charles not to make me, but he
would stand idly by and let me.

On the last night B.J. stayed

there I did put up enough force, even though Charles kept
urging, B.J. didn't have intercourse with me, but Charles did."
As noted in the Affidavit introduced a preliminary
hearing Mr. B.E. Marshall, B.J., did not know he was having
intercourse without the prosecutrix's consent and apparently
the State believed him since he was and has never been charged
in this matter to the best of counsel's knowledge.
'lhe next incident the prosecutrix refers to is with a
man referred to as Rick.

According to the prosecutrix at page

14 of the transcript, Rick had been at their house in March of
1979, and the appellant did not like Rick and according to page
16 of the transcript the prosecutrix had apparently had sex
with Rick before.

See line 3 of page 16.

According to page 16 the appellant had left and later
returned, at which point at page 17, line 1, "he told me to go
to bed with him so I didn't know what else to do, so I did."
.According to page 17, line 26, the prosecutrix had
sexual relations with Rick one more time.
The prosecutrix did testify at page 19, starting at
She indicated that

line 10 why she had not earlier complained.

the appellant had the habit of sitting her down for hours at a
time and going from everything from her folks to her job.

Any-

thing
he could think of to this thing where he wanted me to go
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about it.
The prosecutrix states at page 19 that various threats
were made but there was no testimony that the appellant ever
even attempted any such threats.
At page 20, the prosecutrix testified the appellant
tried to run over her with a truck when she left him but there
is no link that these threats were connected with the alleged
violations that the appellant is convicted of.
The only actual physical violence that took place in fact
is related at page 21, line 30 wherein the prosecutrix took a
butcher knife after the appellant.

At page 56 the appellant

explains he held her down on the above-referred to occassions
to keep her from getting the butcher knives and from committing
suicide.
It is clear from reading the transcript that the
prosecutrix drank a great deal and smoked marijuana often while
the appellant did not.
It is equally clear that the sexual activity was her
idea and not the appellants.

Additionally, with regard to the

letter that was introduced into evidence, it is clear from the
record that the Court did not take it into his verdict.

See

page 54, line 12, wherein the Court stated it had nothing to do
with the transaction the appellant was on trial for.
The facts in this case simply do not arise to the level
of overcoming such earnest resistance as might reasonably be
expected under the circumstances or that the actor compelled
the prosecutrix to submit or participate by any threat that
would prevent resistance by a person of ordinary resistance.
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The appellant simply asks the Court to read the entire

transcript for itself to determine wh .... '-........... _. _______ _
prosecutrix consented or not.
In the case of People v. Keeney, 293 N.E.2d 492

(1973) th

Illinois Court reversed the trial Court setting without a jury.
The Keeney case is similar to ours, in that the defendant
there was charged with aiding in a rape.
There the Court noted:
It is a fundamental rule in such cases that in order
to prove the charge of forcible rape there must be
evidence to show that the act was committed by
force and against the will of the female, and if
she has the use of her faculties and physical
powers the evidence must show such resistance
as will demonstrate that the act was against her
will . . . . It is also fundamental that voluntary
submission by the female, while she has power to
resist, no matter how reluctantly yielded, amounts
to consent and removes from the act an essential
element of rape.
The Court in Keeney noted that the picture of a girl, "perhaps

~

times unstable who engaged frequently and willingly in sexual
intercourse with males and almost as frequently expressed pangs
of regret for her prior acts."
Such are the cases with Zamora v. State, 449 S.W.2d 43
(1969) and People v. Taylor, 268 N.E.2d 865 (1971) where rape
charges were dismissed by reasons of giving consent particularly since no outrage was immediately noted by the prosecutrix and
since the State attempted to rely on fear of the prosecutrix.
The Court in Taylor noted after it stated that resistance
is not necessary if the prosecutrix was:
paralyzed by fear or overcome by superior strength
of her attacker; that it is, however, fundamental
that in order to prove the charge of forcible rape
there must be evidence to show the act was committed
by force and against the will of the female, and if
she has the use of her faculties and physical
powers, the evidence must show such resistance as
will demonstrate that the act was against her will.
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In our case it is hard to believe that the prosecutrix,
if not before, could have complained between the 4th day of
August and the 22nd day of August, 1980.
What seems more likely is that since she filed after
the 22nd of August of 1979, that her sister had told her
mother who told her father what was going on notwithstanding
the prosecutrix's statements to the contrary.

See page 31,

line 27 through 30 of the transcript; and further after Rick
persisted in his demands for the prosecutrix to divorce the
Appellant even though the prosecutrix denied the same events
referred to.
According to Sheri Blackburn, the prosecutrix's sister,
after she discovered Rick under the covers -- see page 42, line
16 through 17, when the defendant was not around and after she
was introduced to Rick on the 22nd of August, 1979 -- line
25-27 -- Sheri Blackburn overheard the prosecutrix state at
page 43, line 12, "you are not going to put me out on the street
again."

Nevertheless, Sheri Blackburn stated she was in another

room and she did not know what the argument was over.

See page

44, lines 2 through 8.
The Appellant was called to the stand and gave an entirely different version of the events.

However, the point is

that the State did not prove its own case, even disregarding
the statements of the Appellant which directly contradict the
prosecutrix's testimony.
In Zamora the Court stated:
But something more than the mere want of consent
must also be shown; there must have been
resistance on the part of the female dependent
in amount on circumstances surrounding her at
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and the accused. Moreover, the resistance
must have been real and not feigned.
Threats
apart, her failure to make every exertion in
her power under the circumstances to prevent
the crime will result in a presumption of
consent.
It must be remembered that in our case, the prosecutrix
was not injured in any way, nor -- what seems even more odd -neither of the people she had sex with were ever charged with
rape.

How could the prosecutrix consent to have sex with the

men not charged, but nevertheless claim such sex was without
her consent?

The State certainly could have charged B.J.

Marshall since the State of Utah had him sign an Affidavit.
It seems clear that the State merely wished to remove the
Appellant from Nephi since it deemed him an undesirable, regardless of how it did it even if an innocent man had to be found
guilty to do it.
Finally, the prosecutrix admitted that she had been a
prostitute in Virginia, see page 25, and it is clear that aside
from the fact that consent was given by the prosecutrix pursuant
to Section 76-5-406, even according to her testimony, the sexual
acts were done in order that the truck of the Appellant's could
be fixed and not for the appellant's sexual gratification, and
no satisfactory explanation can be found as to her sexual
activity with Rick other than the prosecutrix wished to engage
in it.
CONCLUSION
The guilty verdicts of the trial Court should be reversed
and the information ordered dismissed in accordance with the foregoing.
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